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Abstract 
In this paper we empirically examine whether public facilities like providing primary school, 
medical clinics, electricity etc help incumbents to stay in power. Specifically, we analyze the 
parliamentary election outcomes in 483 constituents in rural India from 1971 to 1991. This study 
is based on a simple voter model where the voter looks at the supply of public goods provided by 
the incumbent and then decides whether to re-elect the incumbent. We find empirical evidence 
that voters do significantly care about educational, electricity and communication facilities, 
whereas incumbents face defeat if they provide more medical or safe drinking water facilities.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 In this paper we analyze voting behavior with respect to the level of public facilities provided. 
We compare the incumbent performance in 483 parliamentary constituencies in rural India by 
looking at the level of important public facilities including education, medical clinics, safe 
drinking water, power (electricity) and communications (road and post office). We use the same 
mapping method in our research as Banerjee and Somnathan (2004) to approximate the level of 
public facilities in an electoral district from administrative district data. We empirically examine 
whether the probability of voting for the incumbent increases (decreases) in Lok Sabha-
parliamentary-elections with an increase (decrease) in the provision of public facilities on a panel 
of fifteen major states in India for the period 1971 to 1991.  
        Public choice theories link government spending with voting behavior (Lindbeck and 
Weibull, 1987; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997 and Clapham, 1985). Levitt and Snyder (1997) 
find that in the United States, an additional $100 per capita in non-transfer federal spending 
results in a 2% vote increase for incumbents. A recent study by Posner and Simon (2002) on 
Zambia shows that voters withdraw their support for the incumbent regime when economic 
conditions worsen. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) find both theoretically and empirically 
that parliamentary regimes have less underprovision of public goods, and more rents to 
politicians relative to presidential-congressional regimes.   
         In India, both the central government and state governments are responsible for all 
government functions and the allocation of funds to lower authorities for public goods provision. 
Like most other representative democracies, voters in India delegate control rights and collective 
decision making to elected representatives. The elected representatives are the agents to the 
higher authority, and their lobbying and legislative bargaining results in the final outcome. Pande 
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(2003) shows that mandated political representation favors the scheduled castes (lower castes) 
and tribes to redirect resources to their constituencies. The majoritarian voting system in Indian 
politics induces a politician’s incentives, as normal. 
       It has been claimed that India may be the only contemporary case where incumbent political 
contestants severely disadvantaged1. The last parliamentary election in 2004 was a striking 
example where the government (coalition led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)), enjoying a high 
economic growth rate and significantly improved foreign relations, lost to the Indian National 
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (INC-UPA)2. Linden (2003) estimates that 
incumbents in Indian parliamentary election are fourteen percent less likely to be elected 
compared to challengers. Kumar (2003) analyzes the incumbency effect by looking at the 
number of wins and losses of seats by the incumbent party. Chakrabarti, Gangopadhyay and 
Krishnan (2005) find anti-incumbency a salient feature of Indian elections by looking at changes 
in the proportion of votes polled by the incumbent party.  
         In spite of the considerable empirical literature on incumbency effects in general (Erickson, 
1971; Cox and Katz, 1994), there has been little work done on this topic in the Indian context 
until recently. One problem is that most studies done on incumbent performance in US elections 
(Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Alford and Hibbing, 1981) are restricted to a two-party system, 
which does not reflect the Indian situation. Katz and King (1999) came up with a statistical 
approach to analyze the incumbency effect in a multi-party context. This approach is 
theoretically close to Indian politics but is difficult to fit in Indian political complexities. 
Growing numbers of political parties and frequent changes in electoral alliances or coalitions 
make it complex to track incumbent performance chronologically. 
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       One problem has been access to proper election data, which only recently has been available 
electronically. Another problem is aligning outcomes to socio-economic data since decennial 
census data on social and economic factors are published by district, not parliamentary 
constituency3. Banerjee and Somnathan (2004) tried to overcome this problem by mapping 
district areas to constituency boundaries to approximate the socio-economic status of each 
constituency. Virmani (2004) pointed out the lack of good governance behind the poor 
performance of incumbents in both parliamentary and state assembly elections in India. His 
theoretical work is intuitively appealing but is not supported by sufficient empirical evidence.  
        Beyond the poor availability of public goods data for other periods, there were other reasons 
to choose these particular time period used in this research. This period marks the transition of 
Indian politics from single-party to coalition government at the national level. Apart from this 
political change, the contemporary five-year plans (fifth five-year plan, 1974-79 and sixth five-
year plan, 1980-85) necessitated the delivery of public goods especially in rural India, for the 
first time since independence in 1947. It was during this time when delivering public goods 
became one of the crucial political campaign agendas for the first time, such as Indira Gandhi’s 
“Garibi Hatao” (eradicate poverty) program in the 1971 parliamentary election. We thought it 
would be particularly interesting to see the effect of increasing public facilities on incumbent 
performance in this changing political environment.  
         Another difficulty we faced is in defining the incumbency factor. In a complex election 
system like India, the incumbency effect can be measured by looking at party performance as 
well as each candidate’s. Sometimes the incumbent coalition ruling at the center affects state 
election results or vice versa, which can also be called an incumbency effect. Here, we are 
interested only in the performance of the incumbent party, that is, whether a single party won the 
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last election in a constituency is getting reelected in the same constituency. In addition we also 
look at the percentage of votes polled by an incumbent party if it gets reelected compared to the 
percentage of vote polled by it in the previous election.  
          The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a description of the 
data.  Empirical model and specification issues are discussed in section 3. We discuss the main 
findings are in section 4, followed by some concluding remarks in section 5.  
 
2. Description of the Data 
         We define incumbent performance as ‘party incumbency’, where we look at the individual 
parties (both recognized and unrecognized) to see whether they have won two consecutive 
parliamentary elections (see appendix 1 for detailed description of all political parties).  
         We analyze outcomes of five parliamentary elections from 1977 to 1991 (1977, 1980, 
1984, 1989 and 1991) comparing with public good data from three decennial census years 1971, 
1981 and 1991 in fifteen major Indian states. We leave out the northeastern states, Assam since 
there was no parliamentary election held in 1981 and Jammu and Kashmir as there were no 
parliamentary elections in 1991. Apart from that we exclude the constituencies, in urban areas 
like those within the city boundaries of Mumbai (Bombay), Calcutta and Madras. This is done 
because we have public good data from the village statistical abstract, which compiles data only 
for rural India. We ultimately consider 483 (over 90% of the 543 parliamentary constituencies in 
India at present) constituencies spread over fifteen of states.  
 
[Table 1 is about here] 
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           The data on political variables are taken from the Election Commission of India (ECI) 
website. We only consider the parliamentary general election results from the period 1977 to 
1991 in order to match with the public good data. We collected detailed figures for electors, 
percentage of voter turnout, the number of candidates contested and the vote shares polled by 
five major parties (in descending order of polled vote) for our sample of 483 parliamentary 
constituencies. Descriptive statistics for all these political variables are shown in table 1. The 
average number of electors per constituency rose from 611.08 thousand in 1977 to 980.13 
thousand in 1991. The average candidates contested increased more than three-fold over these 
years. Our dependent variable, the party-incumbency success rate, is found to be around 35% 
suggesting an anti-incumbency effect.  
 
           Village census directory data in the decennial District Census Handbook shows the 
availability of public facilities at a village level. We calculate to see how many villages in a 
particular district have any particular public facility, instead of the total number of facilities in a 
district4. Total number of facilities often does not tell us whether it is reaching people in every 
corner of rural India. For example we look at the share of villages in any district having a 
primary school rather than total number of primary schools in a district. This in addition enables 
us to measure the equality of public good distribution across the districts, which is an important 
issue of redistributive policies in a caste and religion-based society like India5.  
 
 
[Table 2 is about here] 
             
              There are six broad categories of public amenities reported by the census of India at a 
village level. These are education, medical, power (electricity), water, post and telegraph and 
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communication. We consider any educational facility (includes primary school, middle school, 
high school etc), any medical facility (includes hospitals, maternity center, health center etc) any 
electrical provision (electricity for agricultural purpose, electricity for household purpose etc), 
provision for safe drinking water through pipe (tap water), availability of post office facility and 
finally paved road for communication. The average shares of villages per district for each of 
these facilities are shown in table 2. Provision of electricity is found to increase substantially 
from 28% in 1971 to 78% in 1991. All other important public goods show a steady but slower 
increase in the share of villages having that particular good over the period. 
               Decennial census data are published on a district basis, not a constituency area. To 
overcome this problem, we mapped6 district-based data into parliamentary Constituency areas.  
Political variables are constituency-based and public amenity data are district-based. There were 
many new districts carved out from existing ones in 1981 and 1991 compared to 1971. In 
contrast to the district boundaries, there have been relatively few changes in constituency 
boundaries. There were 518 constituencies in 1971 going up to 543 in 1991. To generate the data 
on public goods constituency-based, we attach weights to district areas by comparing district and 
constituency maps7. Weights are assigned by looking at the share of a constituency belonging to 
each district. (See Appendix 2 for the detailed method).  
 
3. Empirical Model and Specification Issues 
        The pure theory of electoral competition deals with the electorate’s choice over candidate 
platforms (V. O. Key, 1966; Barro, 1973; Kramer, 1977). In this kind of electoral model, voters 
solve a forward-looking private maximization problem. Incumbent parties maximize their payoff 
by prolonging their stay in office, spending the minimum that ensures their win (Ferejohn, 1986). 
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They strategically look at the electorate’s demands and give importance to those that are more 
important for reelection. Voters can punish an incumbent candidate if she has not performed 
well, but the punishment is ex-post not ex-ante.  
         The goal of this paper is to see if there is an increase in the percentage of villages having 
any public facility in a constituency, the incumbent has an advantage to win the election in that 
particular constituency. This follow from these theories when voters compare incumbent’s 
performance with a challenger’s promise (McKelvey, 1975 etc), and incumbent performance 
plays the active role. Voters can punish an incumbent who is unsuccessful in resource allocation, 
but that is ex-post. There is a time lag between incumbent performance and voter reaction. So the 
empirical model should be of the form:   
(Incumbent Win)  = f (Incumbent Performance) , t  t-1
where election outcomes at period t is a function of resource allocation (in terms of number of 
villages having a specific public facility in a constituency) in period t-1. We have 1971, 1981 and 
1991 census data to measure incumbent performance in terms of levels of public facility 
provided. The left hand side is election outcomes; to match with the public facility data we have 
considered six parliamentary election data 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989 and 1991. We generate 
an incumbent party win dummy from 1977 to 1991. For the sake of comparison we use linear 
interpolation to create public good data for the mid years like 1977, 1984 and 1989. Since public 
good data is available every ten years, if there is an increase in number of villages having 
primary school of a district, it is hard to tell in which year it was built. This linear interpolation 
gives us an approximation of the direction and magnitude of change in the number of villages 
having any public facility in a district. We propose two base models. The first empirical model 
specifies a logit model in the level form                                     
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Yit = α + θ  + X’t + γi it β + Z’it δ + ε                           (1) i    
 
where Yit takes value 1 if the incumbent in constituency i wins the election in t period, 0 
otherwise; α is constant, θ t is a year fixed effect, γi  is the state fixed effect and Xit is the level of 
public provision, Zit is the political control variables associated with election outcomes; t є 
(1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991) and i = 1 to 483. This model finds the associated probability of 
an incumbent party win resulting from the public facility level, controlling for other political 
factors.  
       In the second model we consider the marginal change in public provision instead of public 
provision in levels. The rest of the specifications remain the same. In this model we explain the 
probability of incumbent win by marginal change in the level of public facilities over five 
periods from 1971-77 to 1989-1991.   
 
’Yit = α+ θ t + γ  + (Xi it - Xit-1)  β + Z’it δ + εi                                (2) 
 
4. Findings 
Table 3 privides bivariate correlation of all the public facilities. We find around 70% correlation 
between paved roads and electricity on average. If new paved roads’ constructed in a village then 
the probability of having a post office is around 63% on average. 
 
[Table 3 is about here]  
Arthur T. Denzau & Saumik Paul                  
 
9
  
        Most of these bivariate relationships are in the vicinity of 0.5 correlations with fewer 
exceptions such as educational facilities being less correlated with medical facilities (0.42) and 
safe drinking water provision (0.35). Overall we find positive relation between all of them 
meaning there by all them provided at an increasing rate over the period of study, 1970 to 1990. 
 
 [Table 4 is about here] 
 
            We run regressions on both base models with respect to incumbency measured as party 
performance. Our first empirical model outcomes are shown in table 4 for the dependent variable 
incumbency performance on level data. In table 4 we show four different specifications of 
equation 1. Model 4.1 considers only the public facilities without controlling for political 
variables. We find providing medical facilities, electricity and safe drinking water increases the 
probability of party incumbent win whereas providing more educational facilities, post offices or 
paved roads actually does the opposite. We have statistically significant coefficients for 
educational, safe drinking water and post offices. In models 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 we control for 
different combinations of political variables, where only the congress party dummy is found to 
be statistically significant in model 4.4. Turnout is robust, although not statistically significant in 
dampening chance of an incumbent win. Safe drinking water is the only public facility found to 
be robust being statistically significant in all the models.  
 
 [Table 5 is about here] 
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     In table 5 we show the outcomes of the second model of equation 2. This used the marginal 
change of the public facilities as an explanatory variable for the probability of an incumbency 
win.  Overall findings are more robust in this second base model. Among the political controls, 
voter turnout and electors are robustly negative. Electricity was positive and robust in the first 
model, but in the second model we find as more villages get electrified, an incumbent has a 
lower chance of getting reelected. Increases in number of villages having post offices increases 
the probability of win except in model 5.4. In these two models we control for a Congress party 
dummy instead of margin of win or win vote share. In the marginal model we find a more 
statistically significant role of the control variables than in the level form model.  
           The overall statistical findings are mixed. It is hard to believe where we find negative 
coefficients of the public facilities-people turn the incumbent down because they got more of that 
particular facility? Paved road and post offices are robust in this regard. We can interpret these 
results in two ways. First, voters were always concerned about other facilities, so even if 
incumbents provided more of these goods, voters did not care. Second is populist voting. It could 
be the case that when incumbents win because they are popular, they had heavily neglected these 
particular facilities. In both of these cases we could expect negative coefficient on these 
particular facilities. The Congress party dummy is statistically significant and positively related 
with the probability of incumbency win. This is expected as the Congress party dominated the 
representation in parliament until mid nineties.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The last parliamentary election outcomes in 2004 turned all expectations upside down, as the 
incumbent BJP-NDA (Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) coalition) with outstanding economic 
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performance and foreign relations lost to the INC-UPA (Indian National Congress coalition 
(INC) coalition). Political pundits might explain this as a call for the present ruling INC-UPA 
coalition to concentrate on reducing poverty mostly in rural areas rather than opting for higher 
but inequitable economic growth. This reminds us that both efficiency and equity may be the key 
policy strategies for incumbents. These political turmoil suggest a sensitive analysis by looking 
at the distribution of resources rather than accumulation. 
          In this paper we found some interesting relations between the basic necessities of the 
voters in rural India and their political actions. Today, more than 70 percent of India’s population 
live close to the poverty line, and for them basic amenities are much important than high-
technology based growth. But the complex bureaucratic process by which funds are distributed 
to local authorities is not transparent and therefore it is always hard to measure how or how it 
takes place. Factors like populist voting, or the charismatic personality of the politicians is much 
easier to deal with in theoretical models, but become extremely difficult when we try to interpret 
them empirically.  
                    Castes and religions play major pivotal roles in the case of swing votes and both of 
these factors are outside the scope of this paper. Analyzing caste and religion-based politics 
along with these public facilities for incumbent performance may be an useful extension. This 
may also explain why among the first-past-the-post election systems, India is a rare case with 
multiple dominant party, refuting Duverger’s law. This is left for future research.  
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Notes:  
                                                 
1 Compared to the nations where free elections are held.  
2 See Wilkinson (2005) for detailed summary of 2004 parliamentary election in India.  
3 In India the administrative district areas are not same as constituency areas.  
4 See Banerjee and Somnathan (2004) for detailed description 
5 For detailed discussion about public good provision in  rural India and its associated social structure see Banerjee 
and Somnathan (2004), Discussion paper 04-17, Indian statistical Institute, New Delhi 
6 This idea is drawn from Banerjee and Somnathan, ‘The Political Economy of Public Goods: Some Evidence from 
India’, Discussion paper 04-17, Indian statistical Institute, New Delhi 
7 (Butler et al, India Decides) 
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Appendix 1: Party Abbreviations, Name and Code 
 
Abbreviations Name Party Code 
ADC Autonomous State Demand Committee 1 
ADK All India Anna Dravida Munetra Kazagham 2 
BAC Bangla Congress 3 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 4 
BJS Bharatiya Jan Sangh 5 
BKD Bharatiya Kranti Dal 6 
BLD Bharatiya Lok Dal 7 
BSP Bharatiya Samajbadi Party 8 
CPI Communist Party of India 9 
CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) 10 
DMK Dravida Munetra Kazagham 11 
FBL All India Forward Block 12 
GNLF Gorkha National Liberation Front 13 
HMS Akhil Bharatiya Hiundu Mahasabha 14 
HVP Haryana Vikash Party 15 
ICJ Indian Congress(J) 16 
ICS Indian National Congress (Socialist) 17 
ICS(SCS) Indian National Congress (Socialist-Sarat Chandra Sinha) 18 
INC Indian National Congress 19 
INC(I) Indian National Congress (Indira) 20 
INC(U) Indian National Congress (Urs) 21 
IND Independent  22 
IPF Indian People's Front 23 
JD Janata Dal 24 
JD(G) Janata Dal (Gujarat) 25 
JKD Jharkhand Party 26 
JKP All India Jharkhand Party 27 
JMM Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 28 
JNP Janata Party 29 
JNP(S) Janata Party (Samajwadi) 30 
KCJ Kerala Congress (J) 31 
KCM Kerala Congress (M) 32 
KEC Kerala Congress 33 
LKD Lok Dal 34 
MCOR Marxist-Coordination 35 
MIM All India Majlish-E-Ittehadun Muslimeen 36 
MUL Muslim League 37 
NCO Indian National Congress (Organization) 38 
PSP Praja Socialist party 39 
PWP Peasants and Workers party of India 40 
RPG Republican pary of India 41 
RPK Republican party of India (Khobragade) 42 
RSP Revolutionary Socialist Party 43 
SAD Shiromani Akali Dal 44 
SAD(M) Shiromani Akali Dal (Simranjit Singh Mann) 45 
SHS Shivsena 46 
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SSP Samyukta Socialist Party 47 
SWA Swantantra Party 48 
TDP Telegu Desham 49 
TPS Telengana Praja Samiti 50 
UTC Utkal Congress 51 
VHP Vishal Haryana 52 
Source: Election Commission of India 
Notes: we coded only those parties, which won any parliamentary seat between the period 1971 and 1991.  
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Appendix 2: Mapping District Data into Parliamentary Constituencies 
Case 1: Single constituency area from a single district area 
This is 1:1 mapping. We use district data directly as constituency data. 
Case 2: Multiple constituencies from a single district 
N: 1 mapping, (where N is the number of constituency from a particular district) here also we use 
district data directly as constituency data. 
Case 3: Single constituency from multiple district areas 
Most of the constituencies fall in this category. For constituencies like these weights for public 
goods are calculated by using the fraction of the constituency that came from a particular district 
as weights for the public good of that particular district. For example in 1981, 60% of Porbandar 
constituency area came from Junagarh district, 20% came from Jamnagar district and rest from 
Rajkot district. We calculated the public good provision of Porbandar constituency as .6*[public 
goods in Junagarh] + .2*[public goods in Jamnagar] + .2*[public goods in Rajkot].  
We used Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991) for constituency boundaries and political map of India 
for district boundaries and physically compared both boundaries to get the mapping coefficients. 
Source: Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy. 1991. India Decides: Elections, 1951-
1991. New Delhi: Living Media India and district map from atlas of India http://www.maps-
india.com/
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Appendix 3: Data Description and Source 
Political Data 
Electors ('000) – number of listed voters per constituency (in thousands) 
Turnout – Voter turnout in each constituency 
Candidates – number of candidates contested in a constituency 
Win Vote Share – Percentage of vote polled by the winner party 
Margin of Win – Difference of vote share between Winner and runner-up 
Party Incumbency – Takes the value 1 if a party gets reelected, 0 otherwise 
Source: Election Commission of India, Parliamentary Elections 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 
1991 http://www.eci.gov.in/
Public Good Data  
Educational – number of villages having any educational facility (primary school, middle school, 
college etc) per district 
Medical - number of villages having any medical facility (health centers etc) per district 
Safe Drinking water – number of villages having water facility from tap per district 
Electricity - number of villages electrified (for any purpose agricultural etc) per district 
Post Office - number of villages having post office per district 
Paved Road - number of villages having bricked road per district 
Source: District Census Handbook, Census of India 1971, 1981, and 1991 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Political Variables 
    1977 1980 1984 1989 1991
Mean 611.08 691.39 757.79 965.47 980.13Electors ('000) SD 57.28 61.73 72.04 98.80 105.78
Mean 60.35 56.65 63.41 62.18 55.56Turnout SD 10.12 10.10 10.23 10.84 12.85
Mean 4.48 8.52 10.04 11.16 15.93Candidates SD 2.19 4.61 6.09 7.97 8.87
Mean 60.91 50.42 53.93 51.17 47.51Win Vote Share SD 9.06 9.41 7.99 9.15 9.72
Mean 27.66 18.81 19.81 15.83 14.24Margin of Win SD 17.01 13.09 13.72 11.99 11.78
Mean 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.37Party Incumbency SD 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.48
Number of observations each year :483 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of Public Good Data 
  1971 1981 1991 
Mean 0.67 0.77 0.82 Educational SD 0.21 0.18 0.14 
Mean 0.12 0.21 0.43 Medical 
SD 0.18 0.20 0.30 
Mean 0.04 0.11 0.21 Safe Drinking water SD 0.08 0.15 0.24 
Mean 0.28 0.56 0.78 Electricity 
SD 0.26 0.30 0.25 
Mean 0.23 0.24 0.33 Post Office SD 0.18 0.15 0.24 
Mean 0.33 0.42 0.49 Paved Road 
SD 0.19 0.25 0.25 
Number of observations each year:  483 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of the public goods 
 Educational Medical Tap Electricity Post office Paved road 
Educational 1.00      
Medical 0.42 1.00     
Tap 0.35 0.55 1.00    
Electricity 0.61 0.52 0.52 1.00   
Post office 0.68 0.48 0.46 0.57 1.00  
Paved road 0.59 0.61 0.54 0.76 0.63 1.00 
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Table 4: Incumbent Performance (level form) 
Independent 
Variables 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 
-0.66* -0.15 -0.59 -0.13 -0.56 -0.13 -1.43*** -0.31  Educational 0.37 0.08 0.37 0.08 0.37 0.08 0.40 0.09 
0.16 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.28 0.06 Medical  0.24 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.26 0.06 
1.05*** 0.24 0.94*** 0.21 0.95*** 0.22 0.67** 0.15 Safe Drinking 
water 0.30 0.07 0.30 0.07 0.30 0.07 0.32 0.07 
0.15 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.18 -0.04 Electricity 0.23 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.28 0.06 
-0.34** -0.08 -0.26 -0.06 -0.23 -0.05 0.29 0.06 Post Office 0.35 0.08 0.36 0.08 0.36 0.08 0.39 0.08 
-0.70 -0.16 -0.58 -0.13* -0.60 -0.13 -0.60 -0.13 Paved Road 0.31 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.35 0.08 
  -0.0001 -2.2E-05 -0.0001 -0.00002 0.0004 8.54E-05Electors 
('000)   0.0003 0.00007 0.0003 0.00007 0.0004 0.00008 
  -0.009 -0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 Turnout   0.004 0.0009 0.0040 0.0009 0.0040 0.0009 
  0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.0009 Candidates   0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 
  0.004 0.0009     Win Vote 
Share   0.005 0.001     
    0.0028 0.0006 0.004 0.0008 Margin of 
Win     0.0031 0.0007 0.003 0.0007 
      1.56*** 0.34 Congress 
Party dummy       0.10 0.02 
-0.009  0.207  0.311  -0.314  Constant 0.221  0.452  0.391  0.420  
Pseudo-R2     0.009 0.011 0.011 0.104 
    Observations 2415 2415 2415 2415 
      (Second row = standard errors) 
*10%, **5% and ***1% significance levels 
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Table 5: Incumbent Performance (marginal form) 
Independent 
Variables 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 
Marginal 
effect 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 
-4.33*** -0.98 -4.44*** -1.00 -4.46*** -1.00 2.13 0.47 Educational 1.44 0.32 1.44 0.32 1.44 0.32 1.54 0.34 
2.32*** 0.52 2.38*** 0.54 2.39*** 0.54 0.18 0.04 Medical 0.48 0.11 0.49 0.11 0.49 0.11 0.52 0.11 
-0.37 -0.08 -0.42 -0.09 -0.41 -0.09 -0.42 -0.09 Safe Drinking 
water 0.70 0.16 0.70 0.16 0.70 0.16 0.73 0.16 
-0.40 -0.09 -0.39 -0.09 -0.39 -0.09 1.20** 0.26 Electricity 0.57 0.13 0.57 0.13 0.57 0.13 0.61 0.13 
1.50** 0.34 1.45** 0.33 1.46** 0.33 -0.68 -0.15 Post Office 0.73 0.16 0.74 0.17 0.74 0.17 0.80 0.17 
-1.06 -0.24 -0.98 -0.22 -0.99 -0.22 0.77 0.17 Paved Road 0.90 0.20 0.90 0.20 0.90 0.20 0.96 0.21 
  -0.0002 -0.00004 -0.0002 -3.46E-05 -0.0001 -2.2E-05Electors 
('000)   0.0003 0.00007 0.0003 0.00007 0.0003 0.00007 
  -0.014*** -0.003 -0.013*** -0.003 -0.013*** -0.003 Turnout   0.004 0.0009 0.004 0.0009 0.004 0.0009 
  0.009 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002 Candidates   0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 
  0.002 0.0004     Win Vote 
Share   0.005 0.001     
    0.002 0.0005   Margin of 
Win     0.003 0.0007   
      1.58*** 0.34 Congress 
Party dummy       0.11 0.02 
-0.60***  0.17  0.18  -0.84**  Constant 0.08  0.41  0.34  0.34  
Pseudo-R2     0.01 0.01 0.02 0.1 
    Observations 2415 2415 2415 2415 
(Second row = standard errors) 
*10%, **5% and ***1% significance levels 
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